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Abstract
As in many other countries, the viability and sustainability of social security 
systems in the Caribbean is of concern to policy makers. Although systems in the region 
remain relatively young, liquid and healthy at this time, timely reform is necessary to 
prevent a crisis in the future. Reform is required to grapple with population ageing, a 
fairly large informal (non-contributing) sector in some countries, high open 
unemployment and the impact of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Caribbean social security systems (pension branch) 
are defined benefits pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems that are largely publicly managed. 
The performance of the systems has been creditable on average, with the accumulation of 
substantial reserves though administrative costs are too high.
Some countries in the region have pursued parametric reforms-mainly increases in 
contribution rates and retirement age and adjustment to wage ceilings to maintain the 
viability of the systems in the future. These reforms could, through various transmission 
effects, impact on sustainability of social security systems themselves, but also labour 
markets, capital markets and economic performance.
Importantly, in considering reform options, countries should not rule out 
including a structural reform pillar, similar to an individual retirement account, which 
could allow contributors to match their appetite for risk with desire for higher returns. 
Moreover, there is the possibility that this could have a beneficial effect on savings and 
investment. Overall, what is clear is all countries should move expeditiously to reform 
their social security systems and not delay until crisis is on their doorsteps.
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In the last few years, Caribbean policy makers, like their counterparts around the 
world, have come to view social security reform as an issue of concern. Nevertheless, 
while some countries in the region have translated concern into actual steps at reform, 
others have failed to do so. Across countries it is beyond moot that social security 
systems are critical to sustainable social welfare and development. However, actuarial 
projections indicate that flat rate contributions and adverse demographic transition, the 
result of population ageing, are undermining the sustainability of social security systems 
in many counties. Since most societies are not prepared to leave the poor and aged at the 
mercy of Darwinian “survival of the fittest” type economics, social security systems are 
set to be an important plank of the social compact in many societies. As a result, in most 
countries the issue is not whether reform is an option, but what will be the form and 
scope of reform.
Indeed, the debate over social security reform, particularly pension reform has 
been heated and, at times, vexing, with much confusion over economic and political 
economy arguments. Nevertheless, overall, as Federick Douglas1 alluded, perspective, 
rather than objective economic arguments, often account for much of the difference of 
views among economists. Ultimately, much of the altercations stem from views on the 
role and function of the State versus the market mechanism in the operation of social 
security systems. Indeed, the State-market debate is often so well covered that it is 
difficult for one to recognise it.
In a way, the demographic transition justifies some form of social security or 
protection. Since consumption continues after retirement and, in particular, the 
individual might be confronted with significant spending on medical treatment and other 
forms of care, it is imperative that he saves during his working life towards this end or 
that the State or other systems provide for him. Given the propensity of some citizens to 
free ride on the social security system, most governments have instituted some form of 
compulsory social insurance contribution system (payroll taxes) to ensure that persons 
save towards old age, sickness, disability and other expenses and contingencies.
Traditional social security systems were modelled on the Bismarck or Beveridge 
models or combinations of both. Bismarck developed the “insurance concept” of social 
security, whereby the system insured workers against the risk of loss of income and 
enabled income smoothing over their lifetimes. For the most part these schemes were 
financed by premiums or payroll taxes, which along with benefits depended on earnings.
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE CARIBBEAN
1 Federick Douglas in “My Bondage, My Freedom,” noted that the longer he lived the more he recognised 
the importance of perspective on issues.
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Traditional social security systems were designed to perform two main functions. 
In the first place, social security is a system of social insurance that provides coverage for 
sickness, disability, old age pensions, maternity and other contingencies. Secondly, 
social security acts as a mechanism for redistributing income from higher income to 
lower income groups. In more recent times, particularly in developing countries, a third 
function has been assigned to these systems. That is, social security systems are also 
charged with catalysing saving and investment and enhancing both financial deepening 
and economic growth. This stems from the view that in developing countries with 
imperfect or missing markets, major institutions cannot be tasked only with meeting 
market conditions or meeting pricing and output targets, but must go further to promote 
economic transformation and growth. There has been some dispute as to whether and to 
what extent the insurance function conflicts with the redistribution and economic growth 
functions. Nevertheless, the three functions: insurance, redistribution and economic 
growth are interrelated, and virtuous processes in any one can have positive externalities 
on the others. This more than ever, underscores the need to examine the potential 
virtuous or adverse impacts of policy in any given one of these areas on the others.
Social security reform, as hinted at before, is a world-wide trend, stemming from 
socio-economic developments at the global level. Ageing, the result of the demographic 
transition, is a major structural driver of reform. The demographic transition has 
accelerated in most countries during the last century because of sharp declines in both 
birth and death rates. World population grew from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 2.5 billion by 
1950 and to over 6 billion by 2000. In spite of rapid growth, declining mortality is also 
resulting in population ageing in many countries, a trend that is set to accelerate in the 
next few decades. For instance, the proportion of the world population over 60 is 
projected to increase from roughly 9% in 1990 to over 16% by 20302. Since most social 
security systems depend on the working population to provide for pensioners, a higher 
number of pensioners relative to the working population (the pensioner support ratio) 
naturally places financial pressure on these systems. The demographic transition 
combined with factors, such as the increasing use of short-term work contracts, large 
informal sectors and high open unemployment continue to impinge on contribution 
income in social security schemes in the Caribbean and other countries. These factors, 
combined with over-leveraged governments with weighty fiscal constraints and 
uncertainty about the long-term trajectory of growth in countries such as the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), make it incumbent that social security reform is 
undertaken in a timely manner to ensure that schemes can meet their obligations to 
members, especially retirees.
This study analyses social security reform and their implications for Caribbean 
countries. Although other aspects are mentioned, the main focus is on the pension or 
retirement plank of social security, the most important component. The rationale for the 
study is the limited research on scope of reforms and what their potential impact on 
Caribbean economies and societies. The study provides an initial foray in this area. The 
study is divided into seven sections. Section 2 provides a broad overview or typology of
2 See James, Estelle (2002). “Social Security reform Around the World: Lessons from other Countries”, 
National Center for Policy Analysis.
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the structure and rules of the systems. Section 3 is a big picture of the performance of the 
systems. The next section, examines the reforms undertaken by social security systems 
in the region, while section 5 analyses the implications of these reforms for the systems 
and the wider economy. Section 6 provides pointers on the way forward for social 
security and section 7 concludes the study.
2. Overview of Caribbean Social Security Systems: Structure and rules
Social security spread from Britain to her former colonies in the Caribbean in the 
form of provident funds based on contributions. These funds were similar to today’s 
funded, defined contribution schemes3. With the move to self-governance, governments 
enacted full social security legislation based on the principles of solidarity and 
redistribution to guarantee a minimum level of welfare for persons aged, the sick, women 
on maternity leave, retirees and other categories of workers. National insurance or social 
security schemes were implemented, spreading from Jamaica in 1965 to St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines in 1986. Full social security was deemed particularly necessary in light 
of intractable poverty among large segments of the population, dualistic economies with 
skewed distribution of income and wealth and the need to move beyond insurance to 
redistribution and consumption smoothing for lower income groups.
Caribbean social security systems, like those in most countries are variants of the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. One of the earliest models of social security, PAYG is 
structured such that the current workforce pays the benefits for the current group of 
retirees. In this system, the social security trust fund acts as a checking account from 
which payments are made to the beneficiaries. Therefore, no funds are allocated in 
advance and benefits and administrative expenses are met from current contributions. 
This structure leads to costs of funding the scheme that are low at the beginning, but 
which increase steadily as it matures.
A simple PAYG works as follows:
Pay-in from Workers Pay-out to Beneficiaries
The major issue of concern in a PAYG is long-term structural balance or 
equilibrium and sustainabililty. Balance and stability is achieved where:
Annual pay in =Annual pay-out
3 In a defined contribution scheme, the outstanding liability of the scheme is the value of the assets in the 
scheme. This implies that if the funds in the scheme are depleted through poor management or other 
reasons, pensioners might not receive any benefit payments. By contrast, in a defined benefit scheme, the 
liability is the present value of the benefits forecasted by the scheme, which is worked out by actuaries. 




B m=Nw/Nb (Wm. Tp)
Where:
Nw is the number of workers 
Wm is the Average annual wage 
Tp is the payroll tax rate 
Nb is the number of beneficiaries 
Bm is the average annual benefit
The above formula suggests that social security benefits are tied to the current national 
average annual wage. Therefore to maintain fiscal balance, at a fixed payroll tax rate, the 
system must maintain a stable ratio (steady state) of workers to retirees. If the steady 
state condition is not maintained due, for example, to the ageing of population or higher 
unemployment or the effects of HIV/AIDS, the scheme would soon be thrown into fiscal 
deficit with benefit payments exceeding contributions. To prevent this, contributions 
would have to be raised, benefits reduced or the retirement age increased.
Caribbean social security systems are partial PAYG systems. That is, in regional 
schemes part of the fund is used to finance benefit payments, administrative and other 
costs and the other part is invested to provide income that could be used to defray future 
benefit and other costs. Caribbean schemes are relatively young by world standards. As 
a result, contribution revenue exceeds benefit payments and surpluses have accumulated 
in the social security trust fund. By their very nature, PAYG schemes follow a growth 
curve with an excess of contributions over expenses in the early rising phase of the 
system, followed by an equilibrium or plateau phase where contributions approximate 
payments, and finally a post-equilibrium declining phase where expenditure exceeds 
contributions. Temporary measures, such as the transfer of funds from other government 
budget sources or from other branches of social security, for instance industrial injury, 
can be put in place to postpone the post-equilibrium effects (system not able to meet 
payments to pensioners). In the long run, however, these measures only delay the 
inevitable collapse of the system. Often, radical and fundamental reforms are required to 
ensure the long-run sustainability of PAYG schemes.
Although the basic structure of most Caribbean social security systems is the 
same, the rules governing the flow of funds, investments and governance vary according 
to perception of individual country needs. In the public schemes, mandatory 
contributions are collected from employers and employees as a flat tax at source. 
Usually, employers are required to contribute more than workers, although in some 
countries, contributions are distributed equally.
Countries display wide disparities in their contribution profiles. Contribution rates 
range from 5% in Jamaica to 16.25% in Barbados (see Table 1 below). The relatively
That is: Nw.Wm.Tp=Nb.Bm
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high variability is further indicated by a standard deviation of contribution rates of 2.5. 
There is little or no harmonisation of the insurable wage ceilings across the region. Wage 
ceilings4 range from 1.2 times average insurable wages in Trinidad and Tobago to 3.4 
times average insurable wage in Saint. Lucia. The low wage ceiling in Trinidad and 
Tobago might mean that pensions will be quite inadequate to meet the cost of living 
when they become due. There is a need for an objective and independent criterion for 
adjusting wage ceilings in a timely manner to reflect living costs and to ensure adequate 
pensioner living standards. Currently, only Guyana adjusts the wage ceiling 
automatically, in line with changes in its minimum wage.
In Jamaica, wage-based contributions of 21/2% by employees are matched by an 
equal rate by employers. The maximum insurable amount per annum is J$250,000, giving 
maximum contributions per week of J$120.
Persons qualify for a pension on average after about 10 years of contributing or 
500 weeks of contribution. However, to forestall future funding problems, some schemes 
such as Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana have set higher qualifying contributions of 15 
years.
With respect to pension benefits it is critical that pensioners’ living standards are 
maintained at a level similar to that during their working lives. This is determined to 
some extent by the pension replacement rates, which is the percentage of a pensioner’s 
average insurable wages that he receives as his pension. Across the region, pensioners 
receive an average of 31 % of insurable wages after 10 years of contribution. To prevent 
persons falling through the safety net, minimum pensions ranging from 6% in Antigua 
and Barbuda and 31% in Barbados are provided for persons who do not qualify for a full 
pension.
4 The wage ceiling is the cut-off amount, above which no contributions are paid- it partly determines the 
level of social protection that is provided to contributors.
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Table 1: Broad Indicators of the Structure of Caribbean Social Security Systems
C o u n tries Y ear B enefits o ffered %  o f E m ployed C o n trib u tio n R ep lacem en t ra te s
started
p op u la tio n
C overed ra te s A fte r  y ears
10 yrs 30 yrs Maximum
Anguilla 1982 SBP without employment injury 85% to 100% 10 30% 50% 60%
Antigua and Barbuda 1973 SBP without employment injury 85% to 100% 8 25% 45% 50%
Bahamas 1974 SBP without long-term grants 70% to 85% 8.4 30% 55% 60%
Barbados 1967 SBP and unemployment benefit 85% to 100% 16.25 40% 60 60
Belize 1981 SBP 70% to 85%
British Virgin 
Islands 1981 SBP > 100% a/
Dominica 1976 SBP 70% to 85% 9.75 30% 55% 70%
Grenada 1983 SBP 70% to 85% 9 30% 50% 60%
Guyana 1969
SBP plus Sickness benefit and 
Medical care 50% to 70% 13 40% 55% 60%
Jamaica 1966 SBP less Sickness and Maternity 
(Maternity for domestics only) 20% to 25% 5
Flat rate pension plus 1.5%
of avg. career earnings
Montserrat 1986 SBP 85% to 100% 9 30% 50% 60%
St. Kitts and Nevis 1978 SBP > 100% 11 30% 55% 60%
St. Lucia 1979 SBP and Hospitalisation benefit 50% to 70% 10 * 58% 60%
Trinidad and Tobago 1972 SBP 50% to 70% 8.7 **
Turks and Caicos Is. SBP > 100% 8 30% 55% 60%
Source: O ff ic ia l in fo rm a tio n  an d  O s b o rn e  (2 0 0 4 )
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Having looked at the structure of regional social security schemes, it is useful to 
assess the extent to which it has influenced conduct and performance of the schemes. 
Conduct and performance are critical since the ultimate test of the validity and viability 
of the schemes is the extent to which they are capable of meeting benefit payments when 
they become due. This capacity to meet obligations would obviously depend heavily on 
the administration and management of the schemes, including the timely collection of 
contributions, coverage and benefit promises, prudent investments and the maintaining of 
a balance between liquidity and long-term capital adequacy.
Caribbean social security systems are young by international standards. This has 
been an important factor influencing the performance indicators and health of the systems 
thus far. Importantly, as young systems, contributions exceed benefit payments and 
administration costs by factors of five or more in some cases. Therefore most of the 
systems are fairly liquid with a good reserve base. In addition, the regional population 
remains relatively young as countries have not made the demographic transition to an 
ageing population. This leads to a scenario where the ratio of contributors to pensioners 
remains high and ranged from 3.4 in Barbados to 16.3 in the British Virgin Islands in 
2003. As a result of the relatively high ratio of contributors to retirees, Caribbean social 
security schemes remain fairly liquid-meeting, an important requirement of these 
systems. On a note of caution though, this situation is expected to change in the coming 
decades. High and persistent unemployment, rapid growth in the non-contributing 
informal sector in some countries, the ‘brain drain’ abroad and the deleterious effects of 
HIV/AIDS on the workforce and contributions should be provisioned for by timely and 
adequate reform.
Currently, reserves remain adequate on average. In 2003, for example, reserves to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranged from a low of 6% in Jamaica to a high of 73% in 
St. Kitts and Nevis, reflecting the fairly healthy position of the systems. Critically, 
relatively high reserves to GDP also underscore the potential social security funds hold 
for financing productive activity. However, the funding levels of the PAYG systems tend 
to decline as they mature, the consequence of increasing benefit pay-outs relative to 
income. However, funding levels as measured by the fund ratio5 for most of the schemes 
have been relatively healthy, as income has surpassed expenditure. The reserve 
expenditure ratio for Barbados has trended downwards on average since the 1960s, 
dropping from over 20 in 1970 to just above 5 in 2003. In Guyana, funding ratio was 
around 18 in 1970, but remains robust at over 10 times yearly expenditure in 2003.
For the region as a whole, expenditure averaged 7.1% of insurable wages in 2003, 
which was moderate. However, administrative expenditure as a proportion of 
contribution income of 17.7% was fairly high by international standards. In the OECS for 
instance, administrative expenses were over 19% of contribution income in 2003, a 
significant proportion by any standards. Arguably, Caribbean social security schemes are
3. The performance of regional social security schemes
5 The fund ratio or reserve-expenditure ratio is the end of year reserves divided by total expenditure during 
the given year.
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using too large a portion of contributors’ funds to manage and administer the schemes. 
Schemes need to make better use of information and communications technology and 
improved rationalisation, organizational and management systems to bring down 
operating costs.
The pensioner support ratio (number of active contributors per pensioner) is an 
important measure of the ‘carrying capacity’ of Social security. As Table 2 shows, the 
pensioner support ratio remains strong at 8.2 contributors per pensioner. However, the 
standard deviation at almost four indicates a fair degree of variability among countries, 
ranging from a low of just over three in a faster ageing country, Barbados, to over 16 in 
the British Virgin Islands, which has a younger population. For the OECS as a whole, 
the pensioner support ratio stood at 7.9 in 2003. This could be eroded over time if the 
loss of preferences for bananas is not followed by development of new activities to 
improve employment.
Income protection is another critical barometer of the performance of the 
schemes. Income protection measured by the average pension a person receives as a 
percentage of his/her average insurable wage averaged 26.9% in the region. This is 
relatively low by international standards. Moreover, there is little harmonisation across 
the region in terms of income protection, with the ratio as low as 16% in Trinidad and 
Tobago and as high as 49% in Barbados. Meanwhile, the OECS countries’ ratio was 
close to the regional average at 27.5 providing income protection on the face of it of just 
more than half that of Barbados. There seems to be a case for social security systems to 
move closer to the Barbados welfare State model to ensure decent living standards for the 
aged population in the region. This of course would necessitate reforms and greater 
sacrifices by workers (in terms of higher contributions) during their working life.
As expected, individual social security performance varies. In Barbados, 
pensions account for about 80% of benefit expenditure, sickness benefit 9% and other 
spending allocated among other heads, including maternity benefits, and disablement 
grant. The scheme has remained liquid; for instance in 2003, benefit payments totalled 
over $270 million roughly 5% of GDP.
Further, the stock of reserves at the end of 2003 stood at over 30% of GDP. 
However, even though reserves seem high in nominal terms, they are only five times 
annual expenditure and are significantly less than the total benefits accrued to past and 
present contributors. Without reform the future portends ill for the scheme, reserves are 
projected to more than double by 2018, but will be depleted rapidly thereafter, indicating 
that investments will have to be liquidated to meet benefit payments, which is an 
unfavourable prospect.
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Table 2: Social Security in the Caribbean-Broad Indicators
5-year 10-year Expenditure Admin Admin Investment
No. of Active Average
Countries Contributors Pension as Average real Average real as a %  of Expenditure Expenditure Income
per Pensioner, 2003 a %  of yield on yield on insurable as a %  of as a %  of as a % of
average investments investments wages insurable Contribution insurable
insurable wage 2003 2003 2003 wages Income wages
2003 2003
2001-2003 2003
Anguilla 11.9 31 1.5 2.5 6.2 2.3 23.0 6.8%
Antigua and
Barbuda 6.3 22 1.5 0.8 5.7 1.4 17 2.1%
Bahamas 4.9 25 4 4.8 9.1 1.7 19 4.7%
Barbados 3.3 49 5.2 5.2 14.1 0.9 6 4.3%
Belize 10.4 25 7.5 7.4 7.7 2.2 34 3.4%
British Virgin
Islands 16.3 21 2.8 2.2 3.1 1 14 5.8%
Dominica 4.5 28 4.6 4.7 11.2 1.7 16 5.3%
Grenada 7.3 25 4.9 5 5.7 1.1 12 5.7%
Guyana 3.4 28 4.1 4.8 11.7 1.9 15 2.3%
Jamaica 9.8 3.5 3.8 0.7 12 6.1%
Montserrat 5.7 17 2.4 2.4 9.1 3.7 41 4.9%
St. Kitts and
Nevis 7.5 28 4 3.2 6.3 1.6 15 7.7%
St. Lucia 11.4 39 4.1 3.8 6.9 1.3 13 7.8%
St. Vincent and
Gren 8.9 30 5.6 4.3 5 1 17 4.6%
Trinidad and
Tobago 6.4 16 4.7 4.7 4.6 0.6 7 6.3%
Turks and Caicos
Is. 14.1 19 0.9 1.6 3.6 1.6 22 0.2%
Average 8.2 26.9 4.2 3.8 7.1 1.5 17.7 4.9
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Actuarial forecasts suggest that reform is the only means of guaranteeing the 
long-term viability of the scheme. The projections indicate that benefit expenditure will 
surpass contribution income, while benefit payments and administrative costs are 
expected to exceed income by 2018. Without reform, National Insurance Fund (NIF) 
reserves will be depleted before 2030. Critically, if  the funds are exhausted, annual 
contribution rates of 25% to 30% will be required to maintain the fund in balance. 
Incidentally, these rates compare with Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden that have passed 
the demographic transition. Also, the number of contributors per pensioners (the 
pensioner support ratio) is forecasted to fall from 3.4 in 2000 to 1.3 in 2060.
The payment of unemployment benefits distinguishes Barbados from most other 
Caribbean countries. Contributions to the fund are shared equally employer and employee 
at the rate of %%. The benefit amounts to 60% of average insurable earnings for a 
maximum period of 26 weeks. The Unemployment Fund has been fairly healthy with 
reserves of $109.5 million in 1999 equal to 4.4 times benefit expenditure. Ironically, 
though unemployment fell between 1995 and 1999, unemployment benefit payments still 
increased. As at 1999 the 1.5% contribution rate was enough to cover benefit payments 
and, with investment income, resulted in a surplus for this branch. The Severance 
Payment Scheme provides compensation for workers who are made redundant. Coverage 
is provided for all employees between the age of 16 and 65, with the exception of some 
categories, including public service employees and partners and independent contractors, 
among others. The employer is responsible for paying the severance payment and can 
then recover a rebate of a proportion of the payment from the Fund.
Up to 1999, the Severance Fund had reserves of $44.4 million, more than seven 
times annual benefit expenditure. Even with a contribution rate of 0.5%, the Severance 
Fund should still be solvent by 2010. Therefore, actuarial recommendation is that a 
portion of the reserves of this fund could be transferred to the NIF to strengthen this fund.
Belize has a relatively young national insurance scheme, which, without reform 
reserves, would erode over time on account of population ageing and a reduced pensioner 
support ratio. For the long-term branch6, the partial capitalisation funding increased from 
BZ$128 million in 1999 to BZ$166 million in 2002. However, from 2005, contributions 
less expenditure (net contributions) are projected to decline steadily despite an increase in 
the contribution rate of 1%. In spite of the expected unfavourable out-turn in net 
contributions, reserves are projected to increase steadily for about 14 years, due to 
dynamic investment income and to exceed BZ$300 million by 2016.
The short-term branch7 is expected to be relatively healthy until the next actuarial 
review. Higher benefit payments and National Health Insurance (NHI) charges have 
been met from contributions and investment income. The fund’s projected average costs
6 The long-term or pension branch in Belize comprises retirement benefits, invalidity benefits and 
survivor’s benefits.
7 This includes medical, maternity and temporary incapacity benefits.
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of 1.95% of salaries are surpassed by the contribution rate of 1.50%, but the deficit is met 
by contingency reserves. The real pressure point is reflected in a fund ratio that has 
slipped from 6.9 times to 2.9 times forecasted annual branch expenditure between 1999­
2002 and is set to continue on this declining path. Moreover, although reserves exceed 
the statutory minimum, they are expected to fall steadily over time. All these factors 
point to the need for reform, which the scheme is now embarking on.
In Belize’s Employment Injury Branch, the cost amount to 2.65% of salaries, 
compared with a contribution rate of 2%. At present, the deficit is covered by 
contingency reserves, although this is a somewhat precarious position to be in. There is a 
recognised need to implement a cost containment strategy to bring costs in line with 
contributions.
The National Insurance Scheme of Jamaica provides benefits under its short-term 
and long-term branches as in other countries of the region. The short-term branch of the 
national insurance system provides benefits for temporary contingencies and includes 
medical, maternity and temporary incapacity benefits among others.
At March 2003, the National Insurance Scheme of Jamaica had an accumulated 
fund of J$25.1 billion. Between 1999 and 2003, pension benefits grew on average by 
16.4% in the face of sluggish growth performance, a factor that clearly pointed to the 
need for reform. Old age pension payments posted average growth of 16.7%, rising from 
J$761.2 million in 1999 to J$ 1.3 billion in 2003. Short-term branch benefits registered 
weaker average growth of 6.1% to reach J$13.7 million in 2003.
Similar to other Caribbean countries, the National Insurance System (NIS) is an 
important player in the economy of Trinidad and Tobago. Between 1995 and 2000, for 
example, NIS income averaged almost 19% of GDP, while expenditure averaged 13% of 
GDP. Moreover, The Trinidad and Tobago Scheme remained relatively liquid during the 
period. Total income recorded a robust growth of 11.6% per year, moving from 
TT$490.01 million in 1995-96 to TT$1,076.28 million in 1999-2000. Contribution 
income posted particularly strong average growth of 19.9% jumping from TT$200.52 
million in 1995-96 to TT$583.03 million in 1999-2000. Investment income registered 
more a modest growth of 8% to reach TT$493.15 million by 1999-2000. With respect to 
the labour market, the pensioner support ratio averaged 6.84 between 1999 and 2003, 
indicating that pension payments have been backed by a strong contingent of working 
contributors. However, in the next decade, as population ageing continues, the pensioner 
support base will be eroded over time (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1: Trinidad and Tobago Projected Population
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Source: Actuary Report of the National Insurance System of Trinidad and Tobago 2000.
The financial health of the fund was bolstered by the fact that expenditure grew 
sluggishly (4.4%), compared with income (11.6%), a reflection, in part, of a relatively 
youthful population. This led to an average surplus of TT$223.06 million over the period. 
A favourable feature of the Trinidad and Tobago Scheme compared with a number of 
others in the region is its relatively lower administrative costs. Administrative costs 
averaged 5.9% of total expenditure over the six years, while expenditure on long-term 
benefits averaged 50.4% of expenses. Administrative costs as a percentage of 
contribution income have been reduced significantly to about 7% in the last few years 
partly due to the rationalisation of operations. This compares favourably with over 12% 
for Jamaica, 13% for Saint Lucia and 19% for the Bahamas, but is unfavourable 
compared with 6% for Barbados.
A critical aspect of social security performance, particularly for pension schemes 
is the extent to which they impinge on government fiscal operations. The reality is that 
although some social security liabilities are not explicit, but implicit, they nevertheless 
have to be borne by the State, as payroll taxes and investment returns are often 
inadequate to fully meet benefit obligations. Although most schemes have a fairly liquid 
long-term or pension branch currently, short-term non-contributory branches continue to 
put stress on governments’ finances, as these have to be funded out of tax proceeds. In 
countries such as the OECS, where liberalisation is followed apace by declining border 
tax receipts, the continued funding of non-contributory and even some contributory 
aspects that suffer from high evasion and non-compliance, might be in jeopardy unless 
tax rates are raised, alternative taxes are implemented or benefits reduced.
Investment portfolio management
Investment income is a vital source of revenue for regional social security 
systems. Moreover, although reform entails raising contributions - there is a limit to the 
pace at which contributions can be raised - it is therefore crucial to invest these funds in 
financial instruments and activities with long-term high yielding returns. In the past, it 
has been all too easy for fund managers to place social security funds in short-term low- 
yielding investments that create a mismatch between these assets and the long-term
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liabilities that they are obligated to meet. Investment obviously presents the trade-off 
between risk and return, and all the more demands the use of experienced fund managers 
and adequate use of information and knowledge of the economic environment.
In the past, the relatively underdeveloped nature of money and capital markets in 
the region limits the options for financial investment of social security funds. This has 
led, in some instances, to second best investment options as first rate instruments such as 
stocks, shares and private bonds are in limited supply. The characteristic feature of social 
security investments in the region is the holding of relatively low-yielding government 
paper and commercial bank time deposits.
The average yield on social security investments for the five years up to 2003 was 
only 4.2%, much lower than the returns in mutual funds, stocks and other investment 
options. Meanwhile, investment income averaged 4.9% of insurable wages, in 2003, 
another indicator of the relatively low rate of return.
In 2003, for example, roughly 70% of investments were in bonds, debentures and 
loans. In Saint Lucia, for example, at the end of September 2002, fixed deposits and 
money at call and government bonds and securities accounted for 32.2% and 10.6%, 
respectively, of the National Insurance Corporation’s portfolio. Moreover, the Scheme’s 
investment policy stipulates a range of 20-25% of total investments for fixed deposits and 
government lending each.
The capture of the social security funds by government might very well divert 
funds that could have been used for the development of private sector activity in tourism, 
agriculture and light manufacturing, even while management strategies seek to limit the 
risks associated with these activities. This is all a part of balancing the development and 
insurance (social protection) functions of social security and finding virtuous links 
between them. The reality is that there is need for stronger linkages between social 
security investments and real sector development. In this respect, social security reserves 
could provide critical funds to finance development in high productivity activities, since 
ultimately the rate of return on these funds is linked to the rate of growth of productivity 
in the economy.
With increasing financial innovation and integration in the region in recent years a 
wider array of investment options is becoming available. This should help social security 
systems to have more balanced investment portfolios that consider relative risks and 
returns and match liabilities and assets.
Importantly, the legislation needs to be made more flexible to allow fund 
managers to invest a portion of their portfolio in foreign markets. Although it must be 
done prudently, investment abroad has a number of merits to recommend it. In the first 
place, it would provide a wider pool of financial instruments to invest in, with varying 
risk and return profiles. Secondly, contributors would be able to hold a diversified 
portfolio that reduces country-specific risks, such as proneness to natural disasters and 
terms of trade shocks in the Caribbean. Thirdly, it could curtail the political risk of
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governments using pension funds to finance public deficits, sometimes in inefficient 
activities as has been done in some countries in the region.
4. Social security reforms and plans in the region
Parametric reforms
Countries have adopted two approaches to social security reform worldwide. 
These are the more conservative parametric reforms or the more radical structural 
reforms. Parametric reforms accept the basic/structural logic of current systems, be they 
PAYG or partially-funded systems, and attempt to make them sustainable by adjusting 
the key parameters, including contribution rates, pension and other benefits, the 
retirement age or administrative costs, among other variables. Essentially, this is reform 
within the system. Structural reform, on the other hand, is a change in the structure of the 
systems, usually the move to some form of privatised funded system. This could be 
deemed a revolutionary change that is adopted when it is believed that the PAYG system 
will not be able to meet obligations to contributors.
The root of the debate over publicly operated PAYG schemes and funded 
privatised schemes harks back to the political economy question of whether social 
protection is better provided by the State or by private individuals provisioning for their 
own future within private sector-operated annuity systems. Although this debate could 
be pursued ad infinitum, the fact is that both approaches have their merits and demerits. 
What is required in a given case, such as the Caribbean, is for countries to attempt to 
assess holistically the overall net benefits of both prospective approaches and to choose 
the one that is most dynamic, sustainable and beneficial to beneficiaries and the economy 
as a whole. In fact, the best approach for the region might be a combination of both 
approaches- that is a basic PAYG pillar and a funded individual retirement account, with 
allocations as fit the needs of countries.
A number of Caribbean countries have undertaken actuarial forecasts and national 
surveys to examine the prospective state of their schemes and public opinion on the 
preferred reform option. Coming out of the analysis, most countries have gone the route 
of parametric, rather than structural reform. Parametric reforms have largely entailed a 
combination of raising contribution rates and insurable ceilings and increasing the 
retirement age. Structural reform is counterfactual since this approach has not been 
adopted in the region. However, structural reform usually involves a change in the social 
security system itself. In most cases it entails the privatisation of social security through 
the movement to a fully-funded defined contribution system, where benefits are based on 
contributions and actual investment returns. A change from a PAYG to a fully-funded 
system entails an important transition cost that is the debt that is owed to the current 
generation of beneficiaries that must be provided for. This debt would have to be paid by 
the government from fiscal revenue.
Some countries in the region are moving forward with reform on the advice of 
actuaries. Barbados is pursuing relatively wide-ranging reforms to set its social security 
scheme on a sounder footing. After widespread consultation and surveys, the final
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reform option is a mixed package. This package entails increasing contributions from 
14% to 18 percent of insurable earnings over four years. The employer and the employee 
will share this increase equally. The retirement age will be raised by six months every 
four years beginning in 2006, up to the revised retirement age of 67 years by the year 
2018. Retirees have the option of drawing an early pension as of 2003, but this will be 
subjected to a reduction in benefits at the rate of U% per month early, from age 64 in 
2003. The objective is to permit those who desire to do so, to retire at age 60, with a 
concomitant reduction in pension earnings. There is also flexibility on the upside with 
persons allowed to defer their NIS pensions until age 70 with increases of U% for each 
month after the standard pensionable age. To ensure the long-term ability of the fund to 
meet benefit payments, the actuary has proposed a target reserve to expenditure ratio of 
five.
The 1999 actuarial report on Belize’s social security system noted that current 
contribution rate is insufficient to meet long-term benefit obligations. Therefore, in 2003, 
a number of reform proposals were advanced to strengthen the sustainability and equity 
of the scheme. As of 1 July 2003 social security contributions were increased by 1% 
from 7% to 8%. Employers will contribute 6U% and employees 1U% up to $130 of 
weekly insurable earnings. Persons must pay a minimum of 50 contributions to qualify 
for retirement grant, up from 26 contributions. Moreover, to capture higher income 
earners, government has raised the insurable earnings ceiling from $320 per week to $640 
per week. This, however, is still too low to provide adequate income protection. In 
addition, sickness, injury and maternity benefits will be doubled from a maximum of 
$256 to $512.
Retirement pension is also earmarked for a 100% increase to $384 per week. As 
of 1 January 2003, the new basis for calculating pensions will be 2% of final average 
earnings for the first 20 years, thereafter, 1.25% up to a maximum of 60% of final 
average earnings. Also, final average earnings, the basis for calculating pensions, will be 
raised from the average the best three years to the best five years earnings to provide a 
more representative8 pension.
To cope with demographic changes, the retirement age will be increased. The 
voluntary retirement age will be raised from 60 to 63 years, while mandatory retirement 
will move up from 65 to 67 years. In addition, an employed widow who receives 
survivor’s benefit will also be able to claim retirement benefit. This reform should ease 
the hardship faced by a number of poorer widows, who barely make ends meet.
With respect to investment, the 2002 Actuarial Review proposes a focus on high 
liquidity instruments and avoidance of long-term commitments. This seems somewhat 
strange, however, given the need to balance long-term and short-term liabilities. 
Moreover, some long-term commitments are precisely the kind of development activities 
in infrastructure and productive sectors that could contribute to development. This is 
important since the long-run rate of return for beneficiaries under a PAYG scheme is
8 It was felt that in many instances, the three best years average led to inflated pensions and did reflect well 
the average earnings of the beneficiary.
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equal to the rate of economic growth, that is, workforce growth plus productivity 
growth.9
The Belize Scheme has also embarked on institutional reforms aimed at 
prudential regulation and streamlining of its operations. A system is being put in place to 
monitor financial and actuarial developments so that timely parametric adjustments can 
be made where needed. The Scheme is set to design key performance indicators (KPI) to 
benchmark performance. Importantly, plans are afoot to revise the government pension 
scheme and the self-employed scheme to capture a wider pool of households. This is 
critical to preventing this group from free-riding on government provision during their 
pension years without making contributions.
In Jamaica, adjustments have been made to benefits offered on the NIS Scheme 
from July 2003. The weekly rate for full rate for Old Age, Invalidity and Widow’s and 
Widower’s Pension has been raised from $600 to $900. Dependent Spouse’s Allowance 
has been raised from $200 to $300. Also, Disablement Pension has been raised from 
$39-$1,740 to $100-$1740. To increase aggregate contributions, government has 
doubled the insurable wage ceiling from $250,000 to $500,000, from October 2003. This 
has implications for the future benefit expenses of the scheme, as under the PAYG plan 
the higher ceiling would mean higher wage-based payments for persons in the higher 
brackets. Ironically, in spite of an increase in benefit allowances and the raising of the 
insurable ceiling, the contribution rate remains constant at 2.5% each by the employer 
and employee. In addition, 20% of the contributions are to be transferred to the National 
Health Fund and a National Health Plan for pensioners was to be implemented in October 
2003.
Saint Lucia has also embarked on a reform programme, in response to actuarial 
forecasts of the unsustainability of the fund. Projections indicate that reserves plus future 
contributions will be able to meet benefit payments for some years yet, but without 
adequate reform, the fund will become bankrupt in the future.
The sixth Actuarial Review conducted in 2000 has pointed the way forward for 
reform of the National Insurance Scheme in Trinidad and Tobago. The reforms are 
parametric as in other Caribbean countries, but are deeper and wider than in countries 
such as Belize and Saint Lucia. On the contribution (income) side, the 12 classes of 
contributions remain in force. However, from 5 January 2004, earnings limits of each 
class of contributors will be indexed to earnings inflation to retain their real value. To 
capture a wider contribution pool, the effective income ceiling will be raised to TT$4,377 
per month and the minimum contributory earnings will rise to TT$433 per month. 
Importantly, the overall rate of contribution will increase from 8.4% to 9.9%, to be 
phased in from January 2004 to January 2006. This relatively small increase at this time 
means that contribution rates will have to be increased periodically.
Benefits will also change to accommodate modifications in contributions. From 
March 2004, basic pensions will be indexed to earnings inflation to maintain their real
9 See Krugman, Paul, “ Notes on Social Security”, http://web.mit.edu.krugman/wwww/socsec.html
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values. This will be achieved by increasing basic pension rates by 24%. Increment rates 
will also be increased to lead to roughly a halving of the difference in accrual rates 
between basic and increment pensions. This would result in a further increase in 
increments of 71.6% and an overall increase of 112.8% when indexation is included.
An important welfare-improving change to retirement benefits was the 
introduction of a minimum pension of TT$1000 per month from 1 October 2003. In 
addition, pensions will be payable for persons who retire at age 60. Pensioners who 
return to work will still be entitled to their pension and will be eligible for employment 
injury coverage by paying class Z contributions.
In contrast to the English-speaking Caribbean, the Dominican Republic has 
followed the Chilean model of structural reform. This reform entailed the move to multi­
plank pension system designed for three categories of workers. In the first place, the 
elderly, the poor and workers with incomes below the minimum threshold, will benefit 
from a subsidised social assistance or non-contributory scheme. Secondly, a subsidised 
contributory scheme has been set up to cover self-employed contributors with incomes 
above a minimum threshold. Finally, a non-subsidised contributory scheme will be set 
up for workers earning above the minimum income threshold. Importantly, both 
contributory schemes will be operated as funded defined contribution schemes. 
Accumulated contributions and investment returns during a person’s working life will be 
used to purchase a price indexed annuity which fund retirement payments. This is 
effectively an individual retirement account.
The gross contribution rate will be increased gradually over five years to 10%. 
This is at the lower end of the range for other funded schemes in Latin America. In Chile 
and Bolivia the contribution rate is over 12%, whereas in Eastern Europe, Kazakhstan’s 
is about 10%. An interesting feature of the Dominican Republic’s reform is the attempt 
to attract the self-employed by government subsidising their contributions.
Structural reform: Issues for consideration
The foregoing analysis centres on parametric (system adjustment) reforms since 
this is the approach that has been adopted in almost all Caribbean countries. These 
reforms are largely State driven, that is, non-market in nature. However, the combination 
of non-market and market reforms might provide a stronger catalyst for social security 
saving, investment and beneficial impact on growth and development. As in most things, 
the option should not be an all or nothing one, but should be configured to meet the 
structure of the social security systems, their conduct and the stage of development of the 
countries of the region.
Although confronted by some of the same structural constraints, the reality is that 
Caribbean economies are not at the same stage of development as they were when their 
social security and pension systems were first designed. Moreover, the level of 
knowledge of what should constitute an efficient, effective and development-enhancing
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system has also improved. Therefore, social security reform in the region should be 
informed by these two considerations.
An important consideration with respect to the stage of development is progress 
made in the development of money and capital markets and also in achieving 
macroeconomic stability in the region. The Caribbean financial sector of today is more 
sophisticated than at the time of the development of social security systems. Improved 
prudential regulation, risk assessment systems and financial innovation now provides the 
platform for wider options in the investment of social security funds. In addition, citizens 
are now more investor savvy and concerned about the rate of return that they can receive 
on their investments.
Given that reform would have to be undertaken on a graduated basis over time, 
there is no reason why countries should not consider the costs and benefits of 
implementing some structural reform to the system in the future if there are net benefits 
in doing so. It seems that apart from the PAYG component that addresses the issues of 
equity and solidarity, some countries might benefit from a private pillar, similar to the 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA)10 and 401 accounts in the United States that allow 
individuals more options in saving and investing. For example, some persons might 
prefer to opt for a part pension and part endowment fund that allows them to redeem 
funds for the education of their children. The reality is that social security payroll taxes 
still suffer from relatively high levels of evasion, especially among certain categories of 
occupations. Therefore, adding a private IRA pillar might act as an incentive for people 
to save for their future well-being. This could stem from individuals having greater 
ownership of the investment of their pension funds and being better able to plan over the 
long term. This is particularly so for the self-employed who, because of the nature of 
their activities, tend to have more unstable incomes. An endowment fund from which 
they could draw to smooth their income and consumption could help in improving the 
welfare of the self-employed. They would of course contribute to the first pillar to get 
their base pension, but the additional pillar would allow them much needed flexibility.
In addition, as the financial systems in the region become more sophisticated, 
competition for funds could improve the supply of competent fund managers who are 
capable of efficiently managing retirement accounts, while ensuring both stable and 
adequate earnings for retirement. Indeed, in the private sector, a number of persons, 
especially in the larger countries, such as Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, 
already utilise private retirement funds to save/invest for their retirement. These 
instruments tend to complement State pension systems that are often deemed inadequate.
Moreover, it is anticipated that the partial structural reform advocated here, unlike 
the fully funded approach undertaken in Chile and other countries, will entail relatively
10 An Individual Retirement Account (IRA) allows a person to save a portion of his income for retirement. 
The funds are usually invested in some instrument that is often managed by a private fund manager. 
Unlike, a PAYG account, where government might bail out an insolvent fund the IRA holder faces a 
greater risk that his saving could be wiped out by imprudent fund managers or adverse economic 
circumstances.
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low transition costs. As suggested by Charles Herbert11, structural reform could be based 
on allowing current pensioners to receive current benefits and providing an initial defined 
contribution credit for outstanding benefits for current contributors. This will reduce the 
transition costs. In addition, mandatory fixed defined contribution payments would have 
to be made, which would determine benefits. Retirement benefits can be converted into 
an annuity to provide a stream of income over the course of the person’s retirement.
Social security systems, like central banks and private insurance systems in the 
region are faced with a paradox. That is, how to manage their funds and maintain the 
security and stability aspect of their function, while at the same time contributing to the 
development process, which in some cases might conflict with the very goal of security 
and stability. However, the development function cannot be ignored otherwise it will 
undermine the other two.
5. The implications of social security reform for the region
It is self evident that the impact of social security reform on regional economies 
would depend on the type, extent and timeliness with which reform is undertaken. 
Parametric reform, which is the option, preferred by most countries, is not expected to 
have the same impact as structural reforms; further, even within parametric reforms 
options that entail changing contribution rates alone will have different implications from 
those that involve changing contribution rates and the retirement age.
The parametric reforms that are being undertaken by the majority of social 
security schemes in the region will stabilise the funds in the next three to four decades. 
Without reform, most funds will be faced with negative reserves after about 2030 
according to actuarial forecasts. This disequilibrium situation would mean that 
governments might be forced to meet pension and other social welfare payments from the 
general budget.
Generally, maintaining the partially funded PAYG systems, instead of moving to 
funded systems could lead to a trade-off in favour of equity and redistribution rather than 
efficiency. The reality is that fiscal balance or equilibrium can be attained under both 
systems, but political economy factors such as government control of the investment 
decisions, limited portfolio diversification, especially in foreign investments and the 
dampening effects of higher contributions on business investment decisions might mean 
that PAYG could have some sub-optimal effects on domestic savings and investments.
Social security reform will have varying impacts on countries in the region 
depending on depth and scope of reform in individual States and the transmission effects 
on financial and labour markets and on economic growth. Countries such as Barbados 
and Jamaica seem to have made adequate reforms to ensure sustainable trust fund 
balances in the medium to long term, based on the extent of increases in contribution 
rates and retirement age.
11 See Herbert, Charles (2003). “Impact of Parametric and Structural Reforms on the Pensions Systems of 
Four (Caribbean) countries”, Eckler Partners Ltd./Internationally Milliman Global.
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Table 3: Retirement Age Contribution Option for Barbados
C o n trib u tio n s R e tirem en t Age
Y ears E m ployee E m ployer T otal
2002 6.75% 7.50% 14.25% 65yrs
2003 7.25% 8.00% 15.25%
2004 7.75% 8.50% 16.25%










P ro je c ted  rese rv e  R a tio s U n d e r R e tirem en t A g e/C o n trib u tio n  O p tion






Source: Pension Reform: Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the National Insurance Board, 
December 2002.
Table 1 above for Barbados is indicative of the kind of position in which regional 
policy makers would like their pension funds to be in the next decades. The increase in 
contribution rates by 3% spread over three years is complemented by a gradual increase 
in the retirement age for a cumulative increase of two years spread over 12 years. This 
scenario leads to projected fund reserves of 5.1 compared with negative reserves under 
the present non-reform option by 2030.
The reform process in Belize, although a step in the right direction, does not 
appear to be radical enough to sustain the fund in the next three decades or so. The 1% 
increase in the contribution rate might be suitable for the pension branch only. In 
addition, the increase in earnings ceiling to B$320 per week, although a positive step in 
providing pensions that are more in line with actual earnings, is inadequate. As a 
benchmark, the earnings ceiling should be set so roughly 90% of contributors to the 
scheme will fall under the ceiling. Actuarial indications are that the earnings ceiling 
would have to be increased to B$640 to bring it in line with the 90% benchmark. Also, 
increases in the earnings ceiling should avoid overly beneficial redistribution in favour of 
persons whose pensions are based on the average of the best three years, and who have 
contributed on the basis of a lower, more favourable earnings ceiling.
21
Social security reform is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. The more 
direct goal of social security reform is of course to guarantee the financial viability of the 
schemes so that they can meet their obligations of benefit payments to contributors when 
they fall due. However, apart from ensuring financial health, reform must also be geared 
towards buttressing economic growth and development. This occurs through the 
potential for positive transmission effects on saving, investment, labour markets, factor 
productivity, the fiscal balance and other macro and microeconomic variables. There is 
an important feedback process between social security and growth. In effect, poor 
growth can jeopardise the success of social security systems, and poor performance of 
social security systems, given the size of their portfolios can constrain growth in 
Caribbean type economies. Therefore, there is potential for a vicious or a virtuous cycle 
depending on which trend prevails. The task of policy makers is, no doubt, to facilitate 
the virtuous effects.
The reality is that social security schemes hold significant funds that could be 
invested in productive, growth-generating activities. This would necessitate removing 
some of the legal restrictions on the investment of these funds. In the past, these funds 
have been subjected to government capture as evident by the significant holdings of low 
yielding treasury bills in most countries, and the funding of government projects a 
number of which have been uneconomic. This diminishes the beneficial impact that the 
investment of social security reserves could have on the macroeconomy and growth. 
Moreover, many of the funds seem to suffer from portfolio mismatch in that there is 
excessive holding of short-term instruments (assets) to meet long-term liabilities. In the 
OECS, for example, fixed deposits accounted for over 50% of the average investment 
portfolio of the social security schemes during the 1990s.
Apart from the problems with the financial instruments that social security 
schemes hold, the management of the funds to ensure safety and good rates of return also 
presents a major challenge. The shortage of experienced and trained investment analysts 
and fund managers also affects the efficiency of investment decisions. A major 
constraint is limited degrees of freedom for undertaking portfolio diversification, 
particularly the holding of foreign financial instruments. As the World Bank12 suggested, 
the best avenue for preventing inflation from eroding the value of the reserves is 
international diversification of pension fund investments, which is more likely to occur 
when private investment managers are in charge. Although fund managers have to be 
vigilant in hedging against foreign currency risks and limited knowledge of external 
market conditions, a balanced, diversified portfolio with a place for foreign instruments 
offers the best opportunity for optimising rates of return. Indeed, return on investment 
assumes even greater significance, as the schemes grow older, since investment income is 
usually a larger proportion of total income.
5.1 Impact of social security reform on the wider economy
12 See “Averting the Old Age Crisis-Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth,” The World Bank
22
One of the major factors that has been advanced by the pro-reform lobby is the 
potential for reform to lead to higher savings rates that could augur well for investment. 
Although the impact of social security in a number of developed countries has proven 
inconclusive, this does not mean that social security reform in the Caribbean will not 
affect savings positively. Indeed, the increased contribution rates that are being 
implemented as a part of the reform package in a number of countries in the region 
increases compulsory saving. Nevertheless, there is no simple relationship between 
pension reform and savings and the direction and intensity of the impact depends on a 
number of factors including the strength of income and substitution effects, the 
propensity to save of beneficiaries and overall macroeconomic performance. The income 
effect (wealth effect) of higher contribution rates and increased retirement age could lead 
to reduced long-term savings as households consume more in earlier years in anticipation 
of higher future earnings, but the substitution effect might be positive or negative 
depending on whether investment returns on social security funds are higher or lower 
than alternative assets.
Reform is challenged by the fact that a number of workers in the region are 
relatively myopic in providing for retirement, sickness and other contingencies. They 
make little provision for these expenses because of the expectation that the State will 
provide for them. Moreover, myopia is often compounded by significant periods of 
unemployment for many workers over their lifetime and instability of earnings. All of 
these factors tend to dampen the positive impact of social security reforms. To the 
extent that the champions of reform can drive home the importance of retirement 
provisioning through education and information campaigns, reform might have a positive 
spill-over on savings rates in the region.
Some economists, Feldstein and the World Bank economists among them, argue 
that savings and investment mobilisation is affected by the very structure of social 
security schemes. They contend that privatised fully funded schemes with IRAs and 
other private saving instruments, rather than PAYG, promotes saving and investment. 
The argument here is that IRAs allow individuals to shop around for the best returns in 
placing their funds and this stimulates competition and allocation of funds to high 
yielding productive activities that promote growth. However, even in countries where 
private fund managers are the norm, such as Chile, there is need for effective public 
sector oversight and regulation to ensure that funds are not placed in unduly risky 
speculative investments or are captured by corporate fraud. Indeed, the Asian financial 
crisis was triggered in part by the negative contagion effects of speculative capital flows 
that undermined the banking systems in a number of countries.
Important as higher savings rates are, reform would contribute to improved long- 
run sustainability only if  it facilitates the transformation of savings into productive and 
competitive investment activities. In many countries in the region the investment of 
social security funds is untenable. Governments have almost free reign over social 
security reserves and government paper accounts for a significant portion of the 
investment. Although government borrowing from social security is sometimes used for
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infrastructure development in countries such as the OECS, the bulk of these funds are 
used for current rather than capital expenditure thereby impeding their long-term growth 
impact. In addition, government borrowing (capture) of these funds depletes the balance 
that is available for funding viable private sector activities in tourism, agriculture, niche 
manufacturing and other areas of potential competitiveness in the region. Although the 
schemes invest in mortgages, housing, education and other social activities, there is no 
concerted strategy to facilitate the restructuring of stagnant sectors and for investing in 
bankable new productive activities. Given the long-term nature of the bulk of their 
liabilities, social security schemes could provide some of the equity finance for dynamic 
production and service enterprises.
Of paramount concern is the extent to which administrative reform provides 
experienced and talented fund managers, supported by prudential regulation that could 
strengthen the efficiency of the investment process. In the earlier years of their operation, 
most regional schemes had limits on the extent to which they could diversify their 
portfolios. In particular investment in foreign assets was forbidden in most schemes. 
The architects of the schemes presumably thought that the capital deficit countries of the 
region should not be exporting capital to developed surplus capital markets in the United 
States, Europe and other countries. More importantly though, they feared the exchange 
rate, market volatility and other risks that were associated with a foreign market, which 
they neither knew well, nor had any control over. However, excess liquidity in the 
regional banking sector which has dampened rates of return on fixed and other 
commercial bank deposits, compounded by the nascent nature of the regional securities 
market means that foreign investment must be considered a serious alternative source of 
investment to secure the best returns for schemes. With increasing growth in regional 
cross-border financial transactions, especially out of Trinidad and Tobago, the regional 
money and capital markets should be considered as options for diversifying the risks and 
improving the returns of social security schemes.
Another issue with respect to fund management is whether funds should be 
managed competitively by a number of private fund managers or centrally by a 
government fund management agency. Like most things, there are two sides to this story. 
Governments have chosen to institute an investment board that tends to benefit from 
economies of scale from the pooling of investment funds. However, it is often argued 
that a number of competitive private investment fund managers would do a better job of 
obtaining attractive returns for beneficiaries and also channel the funds to activities that 
promote growth. Moreover, with regional integration, there might be scope for some 
regional coordination in the management of the funds in the future.
5.2 Labour market effects
Social security reform is often intended to strengthen labour markets by 
increasing employment, wages and labour mobility and labour market flexibility. The 
reality is that the structure and operation of pension systems can influence labour supply, 
the elasticity of substitution of capital for labour and labour demand, wage rates and
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worker productivity. The difficulty, however, is to ensure that pension reform does not 
affect these crucial variables in adverse ways that dampen growth and employment.
Regional schemes are robust mobilisers of financial resources. A paramount 
concern must be to what extent will parametric reform help to galvanise the labour 
absorptive capacity of the economies. It is anticipated that functional reform could have 
one of two types of effects on regional labour markets. In the first place, the increased 
pay-roll taxes that higher contribution rates represent could act as a disincentive to firms 
to employ more workers or at least reduce their elasticity of demand for labour on 
account of higher costs.
It is anticipated that as payroll taxes are increased during the course of reforms in 
the Caribbean, some firms would substitute capital for labour, as capital becomes 
relatively cheaper as a factor of production. In fact, in a survey of firms13 in the 
Caribbean, high labour costs were mentioned as a major impediment to firm growth and 
competitiveness. This could be aggravated somewhat by higher payroll taxes. 
Weakening labour demand on account of higher payroll taxes could exacerbate the 
unemployment problem in the region, especially in sectors such as petroleum processing 
and some aspects of manufacturing that are already quite capital intensive.
The impact of higher payroll taxes is expected to vary according to the size and 
prior viability of firms. For some small firms in the region that are operating close to 
marginal costs, in the OECS for example, higher payroll taxes could undermine 
competitiveness and viability. Small hotels and manufacturers in a number of countries 
might be undermined by the higher effective wage costs that higher contributions 
represent. Nevertheless at the economy-wide level, the issue must be viewed in 
perspective as payroll taxes are a relatively small proportion of most firms’ total costs 
and firms would weigh expectations of profit and other strategic goals in their 
employment decisions. Consequently, the overall fall in employment as a result of higher 
payroll contributions might be small.
Even if higher payroll taxes do not have a significant direct impact on 
employment in the region, they might affect employment in the formal sector of the 
economy. The relatively high incidence of evasion and tardy payment of contributions 
by a number of firms could increase with the rise in payroll contributions. These higher 
payroll taxes could drive some firms to operate in the informal sector. The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that informal employment averaged about 15% of 
total employment in the 1990s, while in Trinidad and Tobago it declined from about 22% 
in 1993 to 19% in 1999.14 Given the fact that capital intensity, industrial organization and 
productivity are generally lower in the informal than the formal sector, this could
13 ECLAC, (1999), “Competitiveness of the manufacturing and agro-industrial sector in the Caribbean with 
a focus on Dominica, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago”, Trinidad and 
Tobago
14 See Freije, Samuel and Monteferrante, Patricia, (2002), “Common Problems of Back Door Neighbours: 
Social Security and Informal Employment in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela”
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negatively affect output growth. Also, higher payroll taxes might push some firms to hire 
more workers on short-term contracts to avoid paying social security contributions. 
Indeed, the increasing use of contractual labour in the region does not augur well for 
long-term worker welfare since these workers do not benefit from private pension and 
other benefits.
Higher payroll taxes could also dampen wage rates in the region. Since firms 
view payroll taxes as part of their total costs of production, increases in these taxes are 
likely to encourage regional firms to reduce wages, where possible, or resist demands for 
higher wages in order to maintain their competitive position in the market place. This, 
however, would depend on the level of and growth in worker productivity. Therefore, in 
enterprises and sectors where worker productivity is relatively greater, higher wages 
might be acceptable even where social security contributions are fairly high.
On the supply side, higher social security contributions also dampen the incentive 
of workers to work. The labour/leisure trade-off means that the average worker has a kind 
of threshold, above which contributions might lead to a lower supply of labour. The 
disincentive to work can be relatively high where workers believe that contribution 
payments far surpass future benefit payments as occur in some PAYG systems, especially 
uncertainty about the ability to redeem pensions when they become due.
Of critical importance, is the fact that higher contributions could reduce 
investment in human capital enhancement, by reducing funds available for spending on 
training, education and innovation both by workers and firms. This could curtail growth 
in worker productivity and product innovation, which are essential for achieving 
international competitiveness. Furthermore, workers’ time preference implies that most 
people generally prefer not to delay retirement for too long as this reduces the options for 
enjoying retirement income.15 This time preference problem and the desire for earlier 
consumption compared with a longer work-life might encourage a sizeable part of the 
workforce to opt for early retirement where this is available. If this occurs this could lead 
to a vicious cycle of reduced output, leading to lower social security contribution levels, 
thereby undermining the sustainability of the schemes. Such a scenario would be the 
very opposite of the intended result of increasing the retirement age.
Nevertheless, there is another side to the retirement problem, that is, the increase 
in the retirement age under Caribbean reforms could lead to older citizens remaining in 
the workforce for longer periods. Although these citizens might have significant 
experience on the job, their lesser readiness, than younger workers to adapt to new 
technology, retraining and new organizational techniques could adversely affect 
Schumpeterian creative change in firms which, in turn, could weaken competitiveness 
and growth. This is a critical issue in today’s so-called knowledge-based economic 
system, where competitiveness depends on the ability to learn new skills, use new 
technology and adapt to change. Ultimately it must be remembered that economic 
growth sets a ceiling on the benefits of social security reform. Consequently, reform
15 Workers who value travel and adventure, for instance, might not want to retire too late in their lives when 
the likelihood of infirmity and ill-health might make them less likely to undertake such activities.
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options that fail to consider the wider macro and microeconomic transmission effects are 
likely to have perverse effects. The flip side of the retirement issue, however, is that in 
countries in the region where it is difficult for political16 or other reasons to raise the 
labour supply, increasing the retirement age might be the most feasible option for 
maintaining an adequate labour force participation to sustain economic growth.
Much of the research in this area has been informed by the European experience, 
where it is claimed that a well-entrenched social security system contributes to 
“Eurosclerosis”17. The argument is that European countries, such as France and 
Germany, have had to accept lower growth and higher unemployment as the price for a 
liberal “social welfare model” . It could be argued, however, that Caribbean countries 
should be able to fashion a reasonable social welfare model that is still consistent with 
high employment and growth. There is no prima facie  reason why employment and 
growth must be bought at the price of low social welfare. The key issue is how readily 
the economy develops new areas of production and raises total factor productivity and 
levels of efficiency.
In the end, social security reform must be complemented by labour market 
reform. Labour market reform should be geared towards developing a better skilled and 
flexible labour market. This demands improved manpower planning; strengthened 
systems of worker retraining to better adapt to changing technology; and improved labour 
market information systems to match workers to available jobs. Critically, 
macroeconomic and structural policies would have to be targeted to reducing long-term 
structural unemployment, which is a major threat to the sustainability of social security 
schemes.
5.3 Impact o f social security reform on economic growth and development
Having alluded to the critical role of economic growth as a benefactor of reform, 
this point merits some development. The reality is that although expenditure 
management should not be downplayed, it is often given too high a priority in social 
security reform. Overwhelmingly the focus is on maintaining consumption and 
containing the costs/expenditure of retirement pensions, health care and other benefits. 
Of signal importance, though, are complementary measures to liberate production and 
supply side bottlenecks.
Arguments surrounding social security, especially pensions, have suffered from a 
kind of myopia that views the elderly as mainly a liability rather than the asset that they 
can be in the development process. To be founded in realism, the elderly must be viewed 
not only as consumers demanding expenditure on their needs, but also producers, and 
often quite experienced producers. Modern medicine combined with improved
16 Although under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) steps are been taken to liberalise 
the movement of labour it is anticipated that widespread free movement might not take place due to subtle 
barriers and the reluctance of many workers to relocate to a new country.
17 Eurosclerosis is the term used to describe over-regulation of the EU economy including high fiscal 
deficits, high social security costs and rigid labour markets that have constrained economic growth and 
competitiveness of their economies.
27
knowledge of how the human body works enables people to live longer, fitter and 
healthier lives. The real challenge is for Caribbean societies to unlock the tremendous 
skills, training, experience, education and entrepreneurial talent that many of its older 
citizens possess. Returning migrants, in particular, can contribute to economic activity 
by founding businesses and thereby helping to alleviate the unemployment situation in 
the region. But apart from higher factor accumulation based on their skills and 
experience, these migrants can contribute to improved labour productivity and could raise 
average wages and contributions to social schemes.
A critical issue that can impinge on growth is the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. The real issue though is whether this trade-off really exists in the case of 
social security systems, and if it exists, what strategies can be found to minimise the 
impact of this trade-off. One viewpoint following Okun’s notion of the leaky bucket, 
argues that much of the expected benefits of social security expenditures are lost before 
they reach beneficiaries. This view contends that the welfare loss of individuals who pay 
social security premiums is greater than the welfare gain of those who benefit from social 
security. Therefore, social security is deemed to be pareto-sub-optimal.
However, there is a different view that bears consideration, especially in the 
Caribbean context. Economists of this persuasion propose that Okun’s18 leaky bucket 
analogy is unsuitable to the real world because it assumes transactions in a perfect world 
with complete information and competitive markets. Far from this, though, markets in 
developing countries are often underdeveloped, with weak price signals and significant 
concentrations of market power.
In this patently “second best world”, the redistribution function of social security 
may well promote growth and improved economic welfare. This stems from the view 
that in imperfect markets, social security may serve an irrigation function, rather than act 
as a leaky bucket. The reason for this is the view that social security facilitates job 
destruction and job creation and structural change all of which are necessary to growth. 
The social security cushion encourages workers to give up their old jobs when it becomes 
unproductive and facilitates the search for new jobs. Importantly also, social security 
encourages some older workers, who are unable or reluctant to retrain to keep ahead of 
the skills and technological requirements, to leave the workplace. This provides room for 
more productive workers who can galvanise productivity and economic growth. 
However, as alluded to earlier, many older workers may contribute to growth in 
productivity through accumulated experience and skills. Using modelling techniques, 
Marimon and Zilibotti19 find that a good social security system increases the duration of 
unemployment, but also leads to considerable increase in productivity because of better 
matching of jobs to workers skills and experience when skills biased technology shocks 
hit the economy.
18 See den Bultter, Frank, A. G. and Kock, Udo (2001) “Social Security, Economic Growth and Poverty: 
Theoretical considerations and guidelines for institutional arrangements” in Serie Research Memoranda, 
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
19 Op. cit. above in 12
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In the Caribbean where there is very little unemployment insurance, social 
security is critical to maintaining worker welfare during unemployment and also to 
enabling workers to search for a reasonable time for jobs that match their skills and 
experience. In poorer countries in the region, with weaker social security systems, 
workers tend to limit their search time and accept lower quality jobs that are available, 
often with adverse consequences for productivity growth in the economy. Indeed, weak 
social security systems may be one of the factors accounting for the growth in low wage 
free zone-type activities and also the informal sector in a number of Caribbean countries. 
In Barbados, the only country with unemployment insurance in the region, it is believed 
that this benefit has had a favourable impact on the economy by enabling workers to 
search for better jobs. This might contribute to Barbados’ higher rating than other 
countries in the region I in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI).
An oft-neglected issue is the impact of social security systems on structural 
transformation and competitiveness of regional economies. Regional schemes are 
acknowledged as significant mobilisers of funds that can be intermediated to dynamic 
new productive activities in the process of Schumpeterian creative destruction. For 
instance, the organizational and incentive framework could be put in place to mobilise 
social security funds for diversification away from sugar in Jamaica and St Kitts and 
Nevis and bananas in the Windward Islands, to stimulate medium technology 
manufacturing, for example, electronic parts, software development, tropical generic 
pharmaceutical products, and new niches in tourism. The pension component of social 
security funds, because they are geared to meeting a long-term obligation, can contribute 
to capital deepening in Caribbean economies and are well suited to meet economic 
restructuring and competitiveness financing. To meet this challenge, the regional 
financial sector needs to galvanise the deepening of capital markets through a 
strengthened stock exchange, venture capital and merchant capital institutions. Social 
security schemes can then invest a portion of their funds with these development- 
financing institutions, which could, in turn, lend to agriculture and industry
In addition, a portion of these funds could be allocated to education, training and 
retraining of workers, especially to keep them abreast of advances in computer and 
information technology. To the extent that such social security funds that promote 
economic diversification and dynamically competitive activities earn good returns for 
contributors, they provide a win-win outcome for regional economies.
5.4 Other impacts of reform
It is well received that development is multi-faceted and involves more than 
economic growth. Among the other dimensions, redistribution is absolutely essential to 
the quality of development. But redistribution is a problematic area of political economy. 
Nevertheless, it is a cardinal objective of social security, both within groups in the current 
generation (intra-generational equity) and between the present and future generations 
(intergenerational equity). Historically, the move from provident funds to full-fledged
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social security in the Caribbean was aimed, in no small measure, at dealing with skewed 
income distribution in former colonial societies. Early crafters recognised that they had 
to give effect in both letter and spirit to improved social welfare for the mass of the poor. 
Unfortunately today, the growing informal sector and recalcitrant unemployment in many 
Caribbean countries demand a kind of “Marshall Plan” of redistribution of income to 
enable marginalised groups to contribute to social security schemes for their retirement 
and other contingencies.
The fact is that there are two broad means of increasing contributions: increased 
economic growth, especially through higher growth in labour productivity and improved 
distribution of incomes, particularly for the self-employed and informal sector workers 
caught outside the schemes. McGillivray20 makes the important point in criticising the 
gung-ho attitude of the World Bank towards funded schemes, that the critical issue in 
reform is whether economic growth is enough to generate sufficient resources to meet the 
obligations of the retired. Indeed the fundamental issue is how ageing societies will be 
able to sustain growth so as to provide the goods and services for all their citizens. The 
World Economic Forum Pension Readiness Initiative notes that rather than focusing on 
reform of public pension schemes, the focus should be on potential policies that target the 
deterioration of public budgets as a result of population ageing and high spending on 
public pension schemes. Thereafter, technocrats should explore policies and institutional 
changes that would promote economic growth to ameliorate the ageing burden problem.
Nevertheless, although it is concurred that this growth factor is the major driver of 
the success of reform, improved income distribution could also contribute to success in 
attracting informal and marginal workers into formal schemes. In addition, better income 
distribution could lead to virtuous effects by the positive spill-over it might have on 
growth itself, for instance, by enabling marginalised groups to set up small businesses 
and other means of self employment. This would enable them to contribute to economic 
output, where before they were unemployed or underemployed.
5.5 The challenges to social security reform in the Caribbean: HIV/AIDS
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is now a major catastrophe confronting health and 
social security systems in the region. The Caribbean is now recording the fastest growth 
in infection rates in the Western Hemisphere second only to Sub-Saharan Africa on a 
world scale. Continued exponential growth in the pandemic threatens to eliminate a 
sizeable portion of the active working/productive population in the region. Indeed, AIDS 
is now the main cause of death in the 15-44-age cohort of the population. Moreover, 
44% of the cases are found among persons 15-34 years old. In addition, it is estimated 
that this would lead to an average loss of 5% or more in GDP in the region annually.21 In
20 See Mc Gillivray, Warren, “A balancing act: Achieving adequacy and sustainability in retirement income 
reform”, Brussels, Belgium, March, 2004
21 See Theodore, Karl, “Social Security Systems and the Macro-economy: A Caribbean Perspective”, in 
Social Security Financing and Investments in the Caribbean”, Issues in Social Protection, Discussion Paper 
9, eds. Plamondon, P. and Osborne, D., ILO, Geneva, 2001.
30
fact, underscoring the dire implications of the pandemic, the Government of the United 
States has declared AIDS a security risk.
Therefore given that the ultimate viability of social security systems rests heavily 
on growth in the active contributing population and productivity growth, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic could undermine contribution inflows and augment payments for health and 
other expenses thereby weakening the sustainability of the schemes.
The adverse impact of HIV/AIDS would also be felt through a kind of “back 
door” effect on governments. The stark reality is that many eventual sufferers of the 
disease would have been myopic, failing to save or take out health insurance plans. This 
moral hazard problem means that governments would have to take up the slack in many 
cases. Since governments are faced with an inter-temporal budget constraint, they cannot 
shift resources to care and treatment of the disease without affecting other areas of 
spending. It is very likely that governments could use the increased costs of HIV/ AIDS 
treatment as a rational for not meeting some of its social security contributions, hence 
dampening the financial strength of the schemes.
6. Social security - the way forward
What then are some of the key issues to be addressed as the region moves forward 
with social security reform? Although by no means exhaustive, a few issues seem to 
stand out. Even though reforms are already in train in some countries, there is need for 
conceptual and policy rethinking of what social security and protection should mean for 
the region at this juncture in its development and also in light of global trends and 
evidence. With changes in work patterns and the very meaning of ‘work’, ageing and 
production and exchange systems, Caribbean countries need to decide what levels of 
welfare is required and practicable to maintain decent living standards for its citizens 
particularly pensioners and the sick and infirm. This demands careful balancing of the 
solidarity, insurance and redistribution and saving and investment functions of social 
security. Thinking on these issues would help guide reform options, especially PAYG 
versus funded systems.
A critical factor is that most regional social security systems are now at a mature 
stage.22 Given that maturity is a turning point, it is incumbent on those countries that 
have been delaying reform to move quickly to implement appropriate reforms. The 
technocrats and policy makers must solicit the opinion of the public at all levels and 
design a reform strategy that is practicable and addresses the potential imbalances in the 
systems.
Since there are political-economy issues relating to persuading the public of the 
benefits of reform and administrative costs in implementing them, initial reforms should 
be deep and wide ranging enough to prevent the need for frequent changes as the
22 See Alleyne, Frank, “The Future of Social Security in the English-Speaking Caribbean.” Maturity is 
defined as a kind of steady state relation between contribution income and benefit payments, and the 
actuarial demands on the systems to meet long-term benefits to persons who qualify.
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schemes become more mature. For instance, countries that raise contribution rates by 
approximately 1%, complemented by small changes in the retirement age, might need to 
uprate the schemes too often.
Another issue to be addressed pertains to analysing the impact of reforms on the 
economy as a whole. Countries need to design a dynamic interactive model to assess the 
impact of changes in the social security on the savings, investment, financial deepening, 
growth and social welfare. This demands a technical team to carefully assess the 
transmission mechanisms of changes in social security variables on these other key 
economic variables. At the outset, there is need for a well-organized and managed data 
collection system as data shortage remains a major limitation on quantitative analysis of 
the systems.
At the regional level, the CARICOM Agreement on Social Security needs to 
provide a blueprint for improved harmonisation of contributions and benefits across the 
region. This would prevent significant disparities in the levels of welfare of retirees 
across the region, although individual country differences must remain.
7. Conclusion
Social security/insurance systems in the Caribbean, like their counterparts around 
the world, will face increasing financial strain in the future. The maturing of the 
schemes, the demographic transition stemming from population ageing and the adverse 
future fiscal implications of non-reform mean that social security reform can no longer 
remain a luxury, but are an urgent necessity.
Fortunately, many Caribbean governments are now rising to the challenge, 
recognising that the only non-option is not to do anything about their schemes. 
Interestingly, although the World Bank and other agencies have strongly advocated that 
countries move to fully-funded defined contribution systems, no Caribbean country 
seems persuaded to adopt this option. This suggests that the much-touted Chilean model, 
which has been said to have a significant impact on savings and capital market 
deepening, has not convinced regional governments to go this route. In any event, it must 
be remembered that moving from a PAYG defined benefit system to a fully-funded 
defined contribution system entails significant transition costs (outstanding benefit 
obligations to the current generation) that would have to be borne by governments. In 
addition, the prudential regulation and supervision of private fund managers is a major 
task requiring considerable outlay in human and technical resources. Without such 
regulation, poor citizens could lose their retirement savings to imprudent investors. Of 
even greater economic import, though, is the fact that a funded system does not eliminate 
the problem of how to apportion costs between generations to ensure some degree of 
intergenerational equity. Even in a funded system, the young still has to pay for the 
social welfare of the old, as logic suggests.
Therefore, informed partly by theory and their own circumstances, Caribbean 
governments have opted for parametric or functional reforms of current PAYG systems,
32
instead of structural reforms. These reforms are centred on increasing contribution rates, 
adjusting insurable ceilings, changing the retirement age to encourage people to work 
longer and increasing the number of contributions that one must pay before he/she can 
receive a pension. One area of concern is the need for timely increases in the insurable 
earnings ceilings, which determines the level of insurance cover. Where the earnings 
ceilings are adjusted in line with changes in average wages or some close proxy measure, 
this helps to bring pensions closer in line with contributions. Measures are also being put 
in place to strengthen the administrative efficiency and investment management of the 
schemes to enhance their financial viability.
From a financial standpoint, the reforms being undertaken by Caribbean 
countries, once maintained as the need arises, should keep the funds in financial surplus. 
However, this is based on a number of assumptions, some of which are not made explicit 
by the actuarial projections. These steady State conditions include steady GDP growth 
rates, a phased population transition, which could be affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
and reasonable investment returns over time.
33
References
Alleyne, Frank. (2001). ““The Future of Social Security in the English-Speaking 
Caribbean”, in “Issues in Social Security Financing and Investments in the Caribbean”: 
Report of the Caribbean Sub-Regional Tripartite Meeting on Social Security Financing 
and Investment Policies for Pension Funds”, Bridgetown, Barbados, 24-25 October, eds. 
Plamondon, P and Osborne, D.
Barbados Pension Reform: report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the National 
Insurance Board, December 2002
Cornwell, Dan. (1997). “Pay-As-You-Go Social Security”, The Madison Institute, 
December.
den Bultter, Frank, A. G. and Kock, Udo. (2001). “Social Security, Economic Growth 
and Poverty: Theoretical considerations and guidelines for institutional arrangements” in 
Serie Research Memoranda, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Downes, Andrew, S., Mamingi, Nlandu and Antoine, Rose-Marie, Belle. (2000). “Labor 
Market Regulation and Employment in the Caribbean”, IADB Research Network 
Working Paper, April.
ECLAC (1999). “Competitiveness of the manufacturing and agro-industrial sector in the 
Caribbean with a focus on Dominica, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Trinidad and Tobago”, Trinidad and Tobago
ECLAC. (1998). “The Fiscal Covenant: Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges”, ECLAC, 
Santiago, Chile
Federick Douglas. (1969). My Bondage, My Freedom,” Dover publications, Inc
Freije, Samuel and Monteferrante, Patricia. (2002). “Common Problems of Back Door 
Neighbours: Social Security and Informal Employment in Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela” .
GAD, U.K. (2000). “Report by the Government Actuary’s Department on Phase III of the 
Review of the National Insurance System of Trinidad and Tobago as at 30 June”.
Government Actuary’s Department (U.K.) (2000) “The Sixth Actuarial Review of the 
National Insurance System of Trinidad and Tobago”.
Henry, Valda, Federica, “Dominica Social Security in Partnership for the Social and 
Economic Development of Dominica,”
Henry, Valda, Federica. (2000). “Social Security at the Crossroads: A look at the 
Caribbean,” ISSA.
34
Herbert, Charles. (2003). “Impact of Parametric and Structural Reforms on the Pensions 
Systems of four Caribbean Countries”, Eckler Partners Ltd./Internationally Milliman 
Global.
ILO (2001). “Social Security: A new consensus”, Geneva, Switzerland.
IMF (2003). “Jamaica-2003 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for Jamaica.
James, Estelle. (2002) “Social Security Reform Around the World: Lessons for Other 
Countries,” NCPA policy Report No. 253, August.
Krugman, Paul. “ Notes on Social Security”, Http://web.mit.krugman/www/socsec.html 
Lustig, Nora ed. (2001) “Shielding the Poor: Social Protection in the Developing World”, 
Brookings Institution Press and IADB.
Mc Gillivray, Warren. (2004) “A balancing act: Achieving adequacy and sustainability in 
retirement income reform”, Brussels, Belgium, March.
National Insurance Board of Trinidad and Tobago, “Annual Report 2002”
National Insurance Board of Trinidad and Tobago. (2001) “Annual Report 2001”.
Orszag, Peter R. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1999) “Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths 
About Social Security Systems,” The World Bank, September 14-15.
Osborne, Derek. (2003).”Financial Status of Social Security Schemes in the Caribbean”, 
2003 Caribbean Actuarial Association Conference, Barbados.
Palacios, Robert, J. (2003). “Pension Reform in the Dominican Republic”, Social 
Protection unit, Human Development Network, The World Bank.
Rudden, Kyle. (2003) “Caribbean Pension Reform”, June.
The World Bank (1994). Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and 
Promote Growth. Oxford University Press, London.
Vittas, Dimitri and Iglesias, Augusto. (1992). “The Rationale and Performance of the 
personal Pension Plans in Chile.”
